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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the 
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy.  Housed at Georgetown University Law 
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative 
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic 
diseases to health care financing and health systems.  The Institute, a joint project of the Law 
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable 
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has 
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, 
national, and local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper 
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill 
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-
makers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for 
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
 Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon 
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, 
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many 
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare 
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care 
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
 Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, 
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond 
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a 
scientific endeavor.   
 
 Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between 
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent 
and knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order 
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President 
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health 
reform.  In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, 
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these 
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that 
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that 
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform.  In an effort to 
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research 
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health 
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key 
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other 
key players.  This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation 
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health 
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policy-
based and those that are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the 
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or 
prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of 
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for 
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services.  In contrast, legal issues are 
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution 
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as 
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning 
with, “Can we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular 
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and 
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This 
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
 
 
PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
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This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat 
of political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems 
addressed are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a 
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.  
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is 
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or 
make recommendations among them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide 
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal 
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for 
resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, 
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal 
health reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of 
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified 
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a 
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and 
framing of the legal issues.  The attendees of the consultation session included congressional 
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide 
range of interests affected by health reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further 
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current 
law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant 
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made.  There are 
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is 
adopted, the system changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for 
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a federal law regulating the 
administration of private employer-sponsored benefits including health benefits (i.e., health 
insurance offered by an employer).  In general, since the federal government has exercised its 
authority to preempt state regulation of the administration of private employer-sponsored health 
plans, states are blocked from enforcing laws interfering with ERISA. 
   
As many states pursue health care reform experiments, ERISA preemption becomes relevant as a 
potential limit on the scope and type of reforms states are able to enact.  The dominant trend in 
ERISA litigation has been to preempt state legislation and litigation interfering with the 
administration of private employer sponsored health plans, making large-scale state health care 
reform initiatives difficult. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trajectory of judicial 
interpretation of ERISA and to discuss what opportunities exist to facilitate health care initiatives 
given the constraints of ERISA preemption. 
 
RELEVANT LAW – ERISA PRIMER: 
ERISA’s Preemption Provisions 
 ERISA’s preemption clause preempts all state laws that relate to an employee benefit plan.  
 ERISA contains an exception to this preemption rule, referred to as the “savings clause,” that 
allows state laws to regulate the business of insurance.  
 Finally, ERISA (through the “deemer clause”) prevents states from characterizing a self-
insured plan as the business of insurance.   
 
ERISA’s Remedial Scheme 
 Plan participants may bring a civil action under ERISA against a plan administrator who fails 
to comply with a request for information about the plan, to recover claimed benefits, to 
enforce rights under terms of the plan, or to clarify rights for future benefits.   
 A plan participant can only recover the amount of the benefits denied.   
 ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of the 
employee benefit plan.  However, courts tend to be very deferential to fiduciaries. 
 
LITIGATION TRENDS: 
ERISA litigation takes two general forms: the first involves challenges to state regulation of 
health plans and insurers, and the second involves challenges to state tort lawsuits for delay or 
denial of health care.  Though the former is more directly relevant to health care reform 
initiatives, courts have used the same analyses in both litigation areas.  While smaller-scale state 
reforms may survive ERISA preemption, it is an open question as to how the Supreme Court 
might rule on whether ERISA preempts state “pay-or-play” laws. 
 
Challenges to State Regulation of Health Plans and Insurers 
State Pay-or-Play Laws 
 The Fourth Circuit held that Maryland’s Wal-Mart Law was preempted because it affected 
only one company in the state and the law effectively forced Wal-Mart to restructure its 
health benefit plan to increase coverage. 
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 The Ninth Circuit held that a similar pay-or-play law enacted in San Francisco was not 
preempted by ERISA because it applied to multiple types of employers.  In addition, and in 
part because the law applied to employers with and without ERISA plans, employers had an 
actual choice to either pay into county funds or offer health benefits, unlike the Maryland 
law. 
 It is still an open question as to whether or not the pay-or-play provisions of the 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act of 2006 will be preempted.  
Individual Mandates 
 Individual mandates have not yet been litigated under ERISA, but Courts are unlikely to find 
that individual mandates bind administrators and dictate plan choices.   
Smaller-scale State Health Care Regulation   
 State laws of general applicability, such as a state law imposing hospital bill surcharges on 
commercial insurers, are not preempted because their effect on employee benefit plans is 
indirect and insubstantial. 
 State laws that are directed at insurance and that substantially affect the pooling of risk 
between an insurer and insured are saved, thus not preempted.  Such laws include “any 
willing provider” laws that prevent a health plan from excluding any health care provider 
who is willing and able to meet the terms and conditions of plan participation. 
 
Challenges to State Tort Lawsuits  
 State laws that offer a remedy that supplants ERISA’s exclusive remedial structure, such as a 
breach of contract action against a managed care organization for denial of coverage or a law 
imposing a duty on a managed care organization to exercise ordinary care in handling 
coverage decisions, have generally been found to be preempted.   
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if ERISA preemption is to change, it is Congress’ 
responsibility, not the Court’s, to do so.  There are several ways that the federal government can 
act: 
 
Congressional Action 
 Enact ERISA waivers to permit state health reform experiments. 
 Amend ERISA to explicitly allow state-based tort litigation against managed care 
organizations. 
 
Regulatory Action through Executive Authority 
 The Department of Labor (DOL) could define “plan” and “benefit” in ways that expand the 
relief available under ERISA’s remedial scheme in regulations. 
 DOL could publish guidance on valid state options under ERISA.  
 DOL could amend regulations on the fiduciary duty obligations to require plan administrators 
to justify a benefit denial decision with evidence-based medicine.   
 
CONCLUSION: 
ERISA opinions are largely impenetrable, often leading to convoluted legal doctrine.  Nobody 
can easily predict what will be preempted. Yet, there is a certain consistency that emerges over 
time—the return to preemption as the default option.  Given this trend, states must tread 
carefully in crafting health care reform initiatives that address the crisis of the uninsured without 
impermissibly burdening private employers’ provision of employee benefit plans.  
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits 
Peter D. Jacobson, JD, MPH1 
 
Introduction: ERISA Preemption in the Context of Health Care Reform 
 
It should come as no surprise to any observer of health policy debates that the preemption 
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) will play a major role in 
determining the contours of any health reform initiative.  For the past few years, many states 
have been aggressively pursuing health reform experiments, while congressional action has 
essentially been deadlocked along partisan political lines.  Yet after the 2008 election results, 
there is reason to expect considerable congressional attention to health reform.  President Obama 
has made health reform a priority of his administration, and several members of Congress have 
long been waiting for an opportunity to pursue health reform legislation. 
 
At this point, it would be premature to speculate on the actual contours of legislation that might 
be enacted.  But initiatives under serious consideration include “pay-or-play” measures (where 
employers must either provide health insurance or pay the government a defined amount per 
employee), and mandating that individuals purchase health insurance (similar to mandatory 
automobile insurance).  Since similar initiatives have already been enacted at the state level, one 
possible scenario is that Congress may coalesce around legislation that involves some type of 
state-federal cooperation.   
 
Any comprehensive state-level health reform legislation or federal legislation that relies on state 
activity must take into account the states’ vulnerability to ERISA preemption.  An important 
aspect of the balance between federal and state authority is the concept of preemption, which 
means that the federal government can preclude states from regulating a particular area.2  The 
rationale is to provide national uniformity in certain areas.  When Congress legislates in an area 
and reserves power to the federal government, states may not regulate.  For example, the federal 
government has exclusive authority for regulating nuclear power.  That precludes, or preempts, 
any state or local attempts to regulate this field.  Because ERISA preemption potentially limits 
the scope and type of reforms that the states might pursue, federal health reform proposals that 
rely on state experiments without amending ERISA could be undermined.  Even if no federal 
legislation is enacted, ERISA preemption will remain central to the policy debate as to how far 
states can proceed on their own to enact comprehensive health reform laws.  
 
This is an ironic result in two respects.  For one thing, at a time when federal policymakers are 
encouraging state health reform initiatives, a complex federal law may imperil aggressive state 
health coverage experiments.  In the absence of federal action, ERISA preemption may block 
legitimate reforms that the political system desires.  For another, if state efforts are indeed 
blocked, pressure is likely to mount on Congress either to amend ERISA or resolve the current 
political deadlock.  The unintended consequence of ERISA preemption, therefore, is that a 
statute designed to facilitate the national administration of employee health and welfare benefits 
is now the primary impediment to a broad range of state-based health reforms that would benefit 
employers and employees alike. 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the constraints of ERISA preemption in the context of 
potential health reform initiatives, and the opportunities that might exist to facilitate health care 
reform initiatives given ERISA preemption.  Although ERISA would not impede comprehensive 
federal health reform legislation, any serious discussion of the states’ role in the process needs to 
take ERISA preemption into account.  The thesis of this paper is that the dominant trend in 
ERISA litigation has been to preempt challenges to state legislation and liability lawsuits against 
health plans.  From the beginning, judicial opinions in ERISA litigation have generally favored 
preemption over allowing state regulation of Employee Benefit Plans (EBPs) (e.g., private 
employer sponsored health insurance), and preempted most lawsuits challenging a health plan’s 
denial or delay of health care benefits.  Whenever lower courts stray somewhat from preemption, 
the inevitable reaction at the appellate level is to restore preemption as the default option.   
 
To provide an overview of ERISA, the next section briefly describes the salient provisions that 
might affect health reform legislation, followed by a summary of ERISA litigation trends.  
Although the primary focus in this paper is the extent to which ERISA preempts state-based 
insurance regulation, it is also necessary to consider patients’ state medical liability litigation 
against health insurance plans (including managed care organizations) to understand the policy 
context and implications.  The paper then focuses on current litigation challenging state health 
reform initiatives, and concludes with a discussion of potential policy solutions. 
 
I.  An ERISA Primer  
 
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 primarily to regulate pension plans, but also included health 
benefit plans within its scope.3  ERISA governs EBPs, including health care benefits (defined 
broadly to include any medical, surgical, or hospital benefits) covering approximately 65% of the 
insured population.4  ERISA’s goals are to:  establish uniform national standards; safeguard 
employee benefits from loss or abuse; and encourage employers to offer those benefits.  ERISA 
does not mandate that employers offer benefit plans, but provides a structure for national 
uniformity of administration once such plans are extended.  Nevertheless, ERISA has several 
provisions that directly affect state health reform initiatives:  the preemption provisions, its 
limited remedial scheme, and its fiduciary duty obligation. 
 
Many observers and stakeholders credit ERISA preemption with facilitating the growth of 
managed care and allowing large employers to develop national coverage arrangements for 
employees.  The consequences of ERISA preemption lie at the heart of past congressional 
debates over whether proposed patients’ rights legislation, if enacted, would permit patients to 
sue health plans for delayed or denied care, and whether the current state-based health reforms 
underway or under consideration can survive an ERISA preemption challenge.  Throughout this 
discussion, it is important to keep in mind that ERISA presents a series of tradeoffs and careful 
balancing between protecting the interests of health plan beneficiaries (i.e., employees) and 
encouraging employers to adopt and fund EBPs. 
 
A.  ERISA’s Preemption Clause 
 
Traditionally, states are responsible for regulating health care delivery, and litigation against 
health care providers is resolved under state law.  Medical liability lawsuits are rarely heard in 
federal courts.  ERISA alters the traditional approach because it preempts state law, which means 
that state laws purporting to regulate health plans may not be enforced in any court.5  In this 
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context, state laws include legislation and regulations, such as those mandating particular benefit 
coverage, and most medical liability actions targeting health plans.  ERISA preempts state laws 
that attempt to regulate EBPs (both self-funded and fully insured) and drastically limits state 
medical liability lawsuits against health plans, while providing minimal federal regulation in 
their place.  But ERISA does not prevent a state from regulating the underlying insurance 
coverage that an individual purchases in either the commercial market or as provided to an 
employer group plan.  Drawing the line between the two concepts has not been easy and adds to 
ERISA’s general complexity.  The end result is that states can mandate insurance benefit 
coverage for non-ERISA plans, but not for an EBP. 
 
From the beginning, courts have interpreted the preemption clause broadly to prevent 
enforcement of state laws ranging from laws protecting the physician-patient relationship to 
litigation challenging how cost containment initiatives are implemented.  The courts have held 
that Congress intended such broad preemption of state law to allow a multistate employer to 
offer a single, nationally consistent plan to all its workers without the cost and inconvenience of 
complying with contradictory state regulations, legislation, or litigation.  National uniformity 
conforms to congressional intent to keep the costs of administering an EBP low to encourage 
employers to offer health coverage.6 
 
In assessing whether a particular state law is prohibited, courts look sequentially to each of the 
three parts of the preemption provision.  First, courts decide whether the state law “relates to” an 
EBP.7  In doing so, courts consider whether the challenged law burdens the administration of 
plan benefits or has only a remote impact on them.  Courts generally hold that ERISA preempts 
state laws that bind employers or plan administrators to particular benefit choices or that 
preclude the uniform administration of an EBP.8  For example, a state lawsuit challenging a 
benefit determination, such as a health plan’s denial of additional hospital coverage, relates to an 
employer-sponsored health plan because that challenge would require the court to interpret the 
plan’s benefits, hence binding the administrator to certain actions.  But laws with only a remote 
or incidental effect on plan administration, such as a surcharge on hospital services, may not 
relate to the EBP. 
 
A law is not preempted merely because it relates to a plan.  Courts must also interpret two 
qualifying provisions, ERISA’s “savings” and “deemer” clauses.  The savings clause provides 
that laws regulating the business of insurance, even if they relate to an EBP, will not be 
preempted.  Under the savings clause, states are not preempted from enacting and enforcing state 
laws governing the business of insurance (i.e., state regulation of health insurance), such as 
solvency or licensing requirements.  In turn, the deemer clause qualifies the savings clause.  The 
deemer clause prevents states from deeming (or characterizing) an ERISA-covered plan as the 
business of insurance.  States may not characterize a self-funded plan as an insurer to circumvent 
the effect of the “relates to” provision.  
 
As an example of how these terms interact, consider a state law mandating certain health 
insurance benefits.  That law relates to an ERISA plan since it would involve the structure of 
plan benefits.  Even though the legislation would be saved from preemption insofar as it 
regulates EBPs that purchase traditional insurance policies, it would still be preempted if, for 
instance, a state attempted to apply the statute to a self-funded EBP.  Under the deemer clause, a 
self-funded EBP cannot be an insurer. 
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B.  ERISA’s Limited Remedies 
 
ERISA provides some relief for injuries to health plan participants through its civil enforcement 
scheme.  A plan participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action against an administrator who 
fails to comply with a request for information about the plan, to recover claimed benefits, to 
enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits.9  A plan 
participant may also bring suit against a plan fiduciary who breaches any fiduciary duties, and 
may seek to enjoin practices which violate ERISA or the terms of the plan. 
 
Even if victorious, a plan participant can usually only recover the amount of the benefits that 
should have been provided, as well as certain incidentals such as attorneys’ fees.  This is a 
decidedly more limited remedy than usually available under state law, where the patient might be 
able to recover damages for any economic losses, non-economic damages for pain and suffering, 
and possibly punitive damages, especially in cases alleging bad faith insurance denial.10  
Effectively, this insulates the health plan from exposure to monetary damages, except for what it 
would have paid (the amount of the denied benefit) in the first place. 
 
C.  Fiduciary Duties 
 
ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of the 
EBP.  A fiduciary must discharge his or her discretionary functions "solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries" of the plan.11  In many, but not all cases,12 courts have held that 
health plans are subject to this fiduciary duty when making certain decisions, such as reviewing 
the appropriateness of a physician’s treatment recommendations.13  On the other hand, health 
plans and employers are not considered fiduciaries with regard to establishing or changing the 
terms of the plan.  Thus, the fiduciary duty extends only to decisions made once the plan is in 
place.14  Employers must provide whatever health benefits they promise, but need not offer plans 
at all and can change what they offer after giving plan beneficiaries proper notice. 
 
Another aspect of the fiduciary duty is to preserve plan assets, meaning that the fiduciary must 
balance the interests of an individual beneficiary against the interests of all plan participants.  In 
exercising the fiduciary duty, one obvious problem is that the clinical needs of one patient may 
conflict with the health plan’s economic interests (i.e., preserving plan assets to benefit all 
participants).  Increasingly, disappointed plan beneficiaries have sued for breach of fiduciary 
duty, often challenging the denial of physician-prescribed benefits, especially when there is a 
potential conflict of interest.15 
 
To determine whether a health plan breached its fiduciary duty when denying plan benefits (i.e., 
that the denial is not “solely in the interest of the participant”), courts employ different levels of 
scrutiny based on the amount of discretion granted to the plan under the EBP.  Generally, courts 
are very deferential, upholding the plan administrator as long as the plan expressly grants 
discretion to the plan administrator and the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.16  In most 
cases, courts have equated compliance with the terms of the EBP as, by definition, acting in the 
interests of the plan participant.  As a result, the court limits its review to ensuring that the plan 
administrator reasonably comported with the terms of the EBP.17  By controlling the 
interpretation of EBP terms (including medical necessity), health plans retain power vis-a-vis 
physicians.  But in a case where the plan profits directly from the denial, the potential conflict of 
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interest must be considered as perhaps the most important factor in deciding whether there was 
an abuse of the fiduciary’s discretion.18 
 
D.  Federal Regulations 
 
The Department of Labor (DOL) has jurisdiction over ERISA.  For the most part, DOL has taken 
a hands-off approach to EBPs (focusing on pensions), limiting its regulatory oversight to some 
specific procedural requirements.  To be sure, these procedural regulations, such as the types of 
information that must be provided to plan beneficiaries and participants, how claims are handled, 
and required reporting to DOL, are hardly trivial.  But they are not the kinds of substantive 
regulations that are equivalent to state insurance oversight and enforcement.  In essence, ERISA 
preemption creates a regulatory vacuum where states cannot act and there is no comparable 
federal regulatory presence. 
 
II. ERISA Litigation Trends 
 
To understand the nature of the ERISA preemption challenges to current state-based health 
reform initiatives, it is helpful to sketch the trends in ERISA litigation.  Although there are 
numerous branches of ERISA litigation, the two that are most important for health reform are 
cases dealing with preemption of state tort lawsuits for delayed or denied health care, and those 
challenging state regulation of health plans and other health insurers.  The reason why we need 
to look at both types of cases is that they do not operate in isolation from one another.  How the 
courts interpret ERISA in one line of cases influences the judicial analysis of the statute in the 
other area.19  In this sense, both aspects are interpreted simultaneously and contribute equally to 
the development of legal doctrine in ERISA preemption litigation over time.  Because this paper 
is more concerned with health reform, the subsequent analysis will focus on those cases rather 
than on the state tort litigation decisions. 
 
As noted earlier, the dominant trend in ERISA litigation from the beginning has been to favor 
preemption over more expansive interpretations that would otherwise provide states with 
flexibility to oversee how employer-sponsored health plans operate.  For many reasons, however, 
any general statement about ERISA trends is contestable.  To begin with, there is little academic 
agreement on exactly what the cases really signify,20 and little judicial consensus on how to 
interpret ERISA and which lines of ERISA cases to follow.  Finding coherence from the myriad 
of ERISA opinions is quite difficult.  At best, ERISA doctrine is neither predictable nor stable; it 
is, rather, largely muddled and most opinions are impenetrable. 
 
A.  The Early Litigation: 1983-1995 
 
Initial conditions matter, and early ERISA preemption rulings consistently favored a broad 
reading of the statute, especially the “relates to” provision.  With rare exception in the early 
litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly preempted state tort litigation and state regulations of 
health insurance plans. 21  In these cases, the Court defined the “relates to” provision very 
broadly to preempt virtually any law that either refers or connects to (no matter how remotely) an 
administrator’s benefit determination.  For example, the Court preempted a state law requiring 
pregnancy related health benefits because it related to (i.e., burdened) the administration of an 
EBP (prior to Congress’s enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978).22  Viewed as 
a whole, the early rulings established the Court’s approach of interpreting congressional intent as 
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encouraging multistate employers to offer employees a single plan that could be administered 
nationally without the cost and inconvenience of complying with contradictory state regulations.   
 
Deference to congressional intent meant broad preemption.23  A review of the Congressional 
record, however, indicates Congress’ overarching purpose of ERISA was to protect plan 
participants and beneficiaries (i.e., employees).24   And Congress’  failure to give much thought 
to the implications of adding health benefits to what was primarily a pension statute resulted in 
the Court having considerable latitude on interpreting the scope of preemption.  While the broad 
preemption rulings were not necessarily inconsistent with the legislative history, nothing in 
either the language of the statute or its legislative intent required these results.25  Part of the 
interpretive difficulty was that the statute predated the emergence of managed care as the 
dominant mechanism for financing and delivering health care.  At any time, of course, Congress 
could intervene to clarify its intent. 
 
Despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which explicitly reserves insurance regulation to the states, 
these early rulings divested states of regulatory authority over EBPs.  As a consequence, the 
Supreme Court uniformly favored broad preemption of state involvement over a narrower sphere 
allowing states some room to regulate and hold health plans accountable.  Because ERISA 
provides no substantive terms of its own and DOL as the regulatory agency has eschewed 
substantive regulation of EBPs, the oft-noted regulatory vacuum emerged.   
 
Aside from the doctrinal consequences, the decisions themselves are basically impenetrable.  
Neither lower court judges nor academics could easily understand and apply the rulings in 
subsequent cases.  Even Supreme Court judges admitted the muddle that their rulings created.  
For instance, the committed textualist Justice Anonin Scalia subsequently concluded that 
“Applying the ‘relate to’ provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, 
as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else.”26  
Notwithstanding this admonition, neither the Court nor Congress reconsidered the doctrinal 
pedestal of preemption. 
 
B.  Departures From Preemption: 1995-2003 
 
State Insurance Regulations.  The first departure from a stringent preemption analysis came in 
1995 with the case of New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Insurance Co.,27 where the Court signaled that state laws having only an indirect 
economic connection to EBPs would not be preempted.  In this case, New York State 
imposed hospital bill surcharges on all commercial insurers other than the Blues.  The Court 
ruled that the surcharge was a general health regulation that had only an indirect effect on 
EBPs, and did not bind plan administrators to any particular benefit choice.  After Travelers, 
courts have been willing to uphold state health insurance regulations against an ERISA 
preemption challenge where the legislation has only an indirect effect on an EBP.  In fact, as 
discussed below, applying the direct-indirect analysis to current state health reform 
legislation is one key in determining whether state reform initiatives will survive an ERISA 
preemption challenge. 
 
Two subsequent Supreme Court rulings on state regulation of health plans also seemed to 
indicate a judicial willingness to reexamine the conceptual basis of ERISA preemption doctrine.  
In the 2002 case of Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran,28 the Court expanded a state’s ability to 
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require independent medical review (IMR) of specific health plan coverage denials.  The health 
plan refused to cover the treating physician’s non-standard treatment recommendation because it 
was not medically necessary.  Relying on Illinois state law, Moran requested an independent 
medical review of her claim, which the insurer rejected.  Over a vigorous dissent, the majority 
ruled that the Illinois law did not impose a new obligation or remedy, but instead resembled a 
second opinion.  Therefore, IMR was saved from preemption as a legitimate state-based 
insurance regulation that will cause only minimal administrative burdens.  To the dissent, a state-
mandated IMR should have been preempted because it altered the remedies available under 
ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme and hence interfered with the national administration of 
EBPs. 
 
In 2003, the Supreme Court further deferred to state legislation under ERISA’s savings 
provision.  In Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,29 the Court upheld 
Kentucky’s any willing provider (AWP) law against an ERISA preemption challenge.  (AWP 
laws prevent a health plan from excluding any medical provider who is willing and able to meet 
the terms and conditions of plan participation.)30  Relying on the Moran case, the Court ruled 
that AWP laws were saved from ERISA preemption as being specifically directed toward the 
insurance industry, even if they placed limits on other sectors (in this instance, on physicians).  
Recognizing that its prior cases failed to provide the lower courts with clear guidance, the Court 
redefined a two-part savings clause to determine when a state law will be deemed to regulate 
insurance:  “First, the state law must be specifically be directed toward entities engaged in 
insurance.  Second,…the state law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement 
between the insurer and the insured.”  Because the AWP law at issue altered the scope of 
bargaining between providers and insurers, the Court held that the law met the risk-pooling 
aspect of the two-part test. 
 
Taken together, the Moran and Miller cases potentially provide greater leeway for states to 
regulate health insurance arrangements.  Along with the direct/indirect analysis in Travelers, 
these cases provide the analytical framework for determining whether the current state health 
reform initiatives can survive an ERISA preemption challenge. 
 
State Tort Litigation.  Another case in 1995, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,31 opened an even 
wider attack on ERISA preemption.  The plaintiffs claimed damages in state court under theories 
of direct and vicarious liability for injuries arising while being treated at a U.S. Healthcare HMO.  
When Dukes was decided, courts had consistently held that challenges to benefit coverage 
decisions, including delayed or denied care resulting from cost containment initiatives, were 
preempted as involving the interpretation of plan benefits.  Dukes established the principle that 
challenges to the technical quality of care (i.e., treatment claims against managed-care 
organizations for their role in substandard clinical care) do not involve the administration of plan 
benefits and will not be preempted, allowing state courts to resolve the litigation.   
 
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to clarify its view of the treatment-coverage 
distinction in Pegram v. Herdrich.32  In this case, Pegram asserted that her insurance plan’s 
financial incentives for physicians led her doctor to delay an abdominal ultrasound.  During the 
delay, her appendix ruptured, resulting in peritonitis.  After the lower court held that ERISA 
preempted this claim, she reframed the litigation as a breach of fiduciary duty.  The Supreme 
Court rejected the fiduciary duty claim as well, but left open the possibility that the Court 
accepted the treatment-coverage distinction as a basis for avoiding ERISA preemption.  But the 
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Court’s language was ambiguous as to the kinds of mixed treatment and coverage decisions (i.e., 
those instances raising both coverage and treatment aspects) that should be subject to state law.33 
 
C.  Preemption Redux: 2004-2008 
 
The viability of state tort action against health plans did not last long.  In Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila,34 the Court clarified that mixed treatment-coverage cases (arguably the most contentious 
and numerous issues likely to be challenged), would indeed be preempted, holding that ERISA 
preempts a Texas law imposing a duty to exercise ordinary care in handling benefit coverage 
decisions.  The Davila case makes a swift retreat from the expectation that Pegram supported the 
treatment-coverage distinction.  Equally important, the Court refused to extend its rulings in the 
Miller and Moran cases.  Without an extended analysis, the majority opinion rejected the claim 
that the Texas law should be saved from preemption as regulating insurance.  The Court simply 
stated that the Texas law provided a claim for benefits outside of ERISA’s remedial scheme, but 
did not disclose its reasoning for why the Texas law differed from the laws considered in Miller 
and Moran. 
 
Lower Court Interpretations of Davila, Miller, and Moran.  The Davila decision is not the 
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on ERISA, but it is an important one for health 
reform proposals.35  Along with the Miller and Moran cases, how the lower courts interpret 
Davila will clarify the extent to which state health reform legislation survives an ERISA 
preemption challenge.  
 
Citing Davila, lower courts have limited the Miller case in claims for reimbursement under state 
insurance laws.  Despite the Miller decision upholding AWP laws, courts have read Davila as 
curbing the remedies that providers can seek when insurance companies violate these laws.36  In 
decisions interpreting state regulations aimed at expanding health coverage for the uninsured, 
courts have interpreted the savings clause test articulated in Miller fairly narrowly and have used 
the test to preempt smaller-scale state laws purportedly aimed at the insurance industry.  
Similarly, courts have refused to use the Miller test to uphold large-scale state health care reform 
initiatives.  Lower court cases that have interpreted Rush Prudential and Miller have focused on 
the risk-pooling prong of the new test articulated in Miller to preempt laws that do not 
substantially affect the transfer of risk.37  At the same time, courts have upheld state laws where 
they satisfy Miller’s risk-pooling test, such as rules resulting in insurers paying for more claims 
and incurring larger risks or altering the scope of bargains between insurers and insureds.38 
 
D.  Interpretations of State Health Reform Legislation 
 
The central question on the health policy agenda right now is whether ERISA will preempt state 
health reform initiatives.  For our purposes, I will focus on what I expect will be the two key 
preemption issues to address—“pay-or-play” systems and individual mandates.39  The leading 
example of state-based health reform legislation is the much-discussed Massachusetts plan 
enacted in 2006. 
 
The Massachusetts approach combines individual and employer mandates with government 
subsidies.  By far the most controversial and landmark aspect of the legislation is the 
individual mandate, which places responsibility on the individual to obtain health insurance.  
If an individual can afford insurance and chooses not to purchase it, he or she can be fined.  
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Employers with more than ten employees are required to make a fair and reasonable 
contribution to workers’ health insurance coverage or else be subject to a $295 assessment 
per employee.  The assessment fee is intended as an incentive to offer insurance. 
 
One of the main aspects of the Massachusetts reform is The Connector, which allows groups 
to purchase insurance and ensures insurance portability from job to job.  The Connector acts 
as a facilitator between individuals and small businesses and private insurance plans to 
ensure that these plans are of high value and good quality.  
 
To fund the program, the plan redistributes existing funding, including Medicaid payments 
for safety net providers and the uncompensated care pool.  New funding comes from 
employer contributions and general fund revenues.  The Commonwealth Care Health 
Insurance Plan provides subsidized health insurance for households with income up to 300% 
of the federal poverty level.   
 
Pay-or-Play.  Somewhat surprisingly, there has been no ERISA challenge to the Massachusetts 
law.  Since then, other states and municipalities have enacted variations of the Massachusetts law 
that have resulted in ERISA preemption litigation.  Already, there are three appellate decisions 
(discussed below) and several law review commentaries analyzing states’ pay-or-play health 
reform initiatives.  Two of the three cases ruled that ERISA preempted the legislation, while the 
third overturned the lower’s court’s preemption decision.  Although the specifics differ across 
the states, the essential organizing principle of current state health reform initiatives is that 
employers must either spend a certain amount on employee health care or pay a specified fee 
(i.e., a tax or assessment) to the state in lieu of providing coverage. 
 
Maryland’s Fair Share Act required employers that employed more than 10,000 workers to spend 
at least 8% of their total payroll on employees’ health care or spend at least 8% of total payroll 
on employees’ health care costs.  Otherwise, employers were required to pay the difference 
between their spending and 8% of total payroll to Maryland’s Medicaid fund.  The law was soon 
referred to as the Wal-Mart law because it only affected one company.  In Retail Industry 
Leaders Association v. Fielder,40 the court ruled that ERISA preempted the Act because it 
interfered with plan administration.  By forcing the employer to restructure its plan to offer a 
state-imposed minimum level of health benefits, the statute impermissibly related to ERISA. 
 
Suffolk County, New York, enacted similar legislation which also effectively only applied to 
Wal-Mart.  Under the Suffolk County law, non-unionized retailers were required to spend the 
health cost rate amount on health benefits of each employee for each hour worked regardless of 
their full or part-time status.  In the alternative, employers could make a lump sum payment to a 
community health center equal to the number of hours worked by employees multiplied by the 
public health cost rate.  In Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Suffolk County,41 the court 
ruled that ERISA preempted the legislation.  As in the Maryland case, the court determined that 
the legislation did not offer any real choice to employers other than to restructure its benefits 
plans.  The interference with the administration of an employer-sponsored ERISA plan 
impermissibly related to ERISA. 
 
San Francisco enacted an ordinance requiring private employers with 20 or more full time 
employees (FTEs) and non-profits with 50 or more FTEs to make minimum health care 
expenditures for their employees.  The ordinance defines health care expenditures as direct 
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e of their 
RISA plans.”   
nce with ERISA.  (For 
 comparison of the Maryland and San Francisco laws, see Appendix A.) 
 general applicability to all insurers may escape direct 
gulation of or reference to ERISA.   
te and local health reform efforts will remain in ERISA limbo (otherwise known as 
urgatory).   
contributions to the employee, reimbursement for health services, or payments to the City to be 
used on behalf of their covered employees.  Under the ordinance, if the employer fails to make 
the required expenditure on behalf of its employees, it must make payments directly to the City.  
The ordinance is designed to provide access to care for uninsured adults living in San Francisco 
who do not qualify for coverage under Medicaid.  In contrast to the above two cases, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County of San 
Francisco42 ruled that ERISA does not preempt the ordinance.   
 
The Ninth Circuit found that the ordinance does not regulate benefits or charges for benefits 
provided by ERISA plans, stating that:  “First, the Ordinance does not require employers to 
establish their own ERISA plans or to make any changes to any existing ERISA plans….Second, 
the Ordinance is not concerned with the nature of the health care benefits an employer provides 
its employees.”43  Most importantly, the court also found that the ordinance does not bind 
ERISA administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining plan eligibility or 
entitlement to particular benefits.  Relying on Travelers, the court instead concluded that the 
ordinance does not relate to an ERISA plan.44  With regard to the Fielder case, the Ninth Circuit 
argued that the two cases are compatible because Maryland left employers without real options, 
writing, “[i]n stark contrast to the Maryland law in Fielder, the City-payment option offers 
employers a meaningful alternative that allows them to preserve the existing structur
45E
 
What accounts for the different case outcomes?  In two major areas, San Francisco’s law is 
distinguishable from Maryland’s, which may account for the different judicial opinions.  First, 
the San Francisco law applies to a range of employers, and it is akin to a law of general 
applicability rather than a law directed specifically at an EBP.  Second, the options given to 
employers under the San Francisco law represent real choices (i.e., tangible benefits to 
employees compared to Maryland less practical alternatives) in the marketplace rather than a 
forced choice between restructuring ERISA plans or being out of complia
a
 
An important difference between the San Francisco law and the Maryland law is that the San 
Francisco law, at least ostensibly, applies to employers with or without ERISA plans, and is able 
to function without the existence of such plans.  By contrast, the Maryland law was designed to 
apply to one employer in the state, Wal-Mart.  In its decision preempting the Maryland law, the 
Fourth Circuit paid special attention to this fact.  Thus, Maryland’s law amounted to a direct 
regulation on ERISA plans rather than a revenue statute of general applicability.  To avoid 
ERISA preemption, laws that are of
re
 
What are the implications for pay-or-play laws?  Despite the Ninth Circuit’s statement that its 
opinion does not indicate a split in the federal courts, it seems likely that many observers will 
reach a different conclusion.  If so, the apparent split may hasten Supreme Court review.  When 
combined with the important public policy implications of pay-or-play laws, there is a good 
chance that the Supreme Court will accept the inevitable appeal of the San Francisco law.  In the 
meantime, lower courts will continue to struggle with the preemption analysis and will likely 
reach contradictory results.  Until the Supreme Court clarifies whether ERISA preempts pay-or-
play laws, sta
p
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e.  But if the Court reverts to the mean of preemption, as I expect, 
e laws will be preempted.  
) “is 
e kind of mandated benefit structure that remains ERISA preempted under Travelers.”47   
 the Maryland pay-or-play 
ecision (though not specifically referring to an individual mandate). 
nge would be unlikely to 
cceed.51  At best, the administrative burden is likely to be minimal.  
 
As with the courts, health law commentators are split on whether pay-or-play laws are likely to 
survive an ERISA preemption challenge.  While the weight of the commentary suggests that 
these laws will be preempted, that assessment is not unanimous.  Most of those concluding that 
pay-or-play laws will be preempted include such commentators as Edward Zelinsky, Kathlynn 
Polvino, Jon Shimabukuro and Jennifer Staman, who largely adopt the Fourth Circuit’s “relate 
to” analysis.  Amy Monahan largely agrees, but indicates that Massachusetts’s “soft” pay-or-play 
law may offer the courts a way of avoiding preemption without burdening plan administration.  
In contrast, Pat Butler (along with Catherine Fisk and Michael Oswalt) argues that “ERISA 
should not preempt a well-designed pay-or-play law that offers a dollar-for-dollar credit for 
employer health care spending because, under the reasoning of the Travelers case, it does not 
interfere with ERISA plan administration choices.”46  This quote captures the essence of what is 
likely to be the crux of the argument:  if the Supreme Court follows the Travelers line of cases, 
pay-or-play laws could surviv
th
 
Individual Mandates.  Unlike pay-or-play, the issue of whether ERISA might preempt laws that 
would mandate individuals to purchase health insurance (similar to mandatory automobile 
insurance coverage) has received considerably less attention.  As far I can tell, the issue has not 
yet been litigated.  Zelinsky has published an extensive analysis of the issue, concluding that the 
Massachusetts law (currently the most comprehensive individual health insurance mandate
th
 
Zelinsky argues that the individual mandate is not part of a general insurance regulatory scheme 
that effectively imposes a floor on what benefits plan administrators will be able to offer in 
Massachusetts.  Thus, individual mandates bind plan administrators.  Zelinsky argues that the 
statute dictates plan choices, and dismisses the argument that the Travelers line of cases saves 
the regulation from preemption because individual mandates only have an indirect effect on 
EBPs.48  Zelinsky notes that Fielder rejected a similar analysis in
d
 
Without belaboring the point, I disagree with Zelinsky’s analysis on two grounds.  First, the 
mandate goes to individuals, not to any EBP.  Indeed, Butler goes further to argue that an 
individual mandate does not constitute insurance regulation under the savings clause because it is 
directed to individuals, not insurers, under the Miller test discussed earlier.49  If there is a burden, 
it falls on the individual to meet the expected benefits floor or the employer to keep track of 
expenditures made to meet the employer’s obligation.  Nothing in the law requires an 
administrator to adjust its benefit package.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Golden Gate 
Restaurant Association, the individual mandate would not constitute an EBP because the city 
establishes and maintains the mandate.  Since the EBP is not required to establish or administer 
insurance benefits under the mandate, the ordinance does not establish or maintain an ERISA 
plan.50  Second, under Travelers, as Monahan observes, the individual mandate has such a 
tangential relationship to an EBP that an ERISA preemption challe
su
 
In this context, it is worth noting (at least for analytical, if not necessarily legal, import) that the 
first prong of DOL’s safe harbor for determining when a health plan does not constitute an 
ERISA plan is that no contributions are made by an employer or employee organization.52  In 
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irable health policy, but if 
nacted, the mandate should survive an ERISA preemption challenge. 
 amending ERISA to permit state health reform experiments to proceed 
n a sufficient scale.   
I. Potential Solutions
any event, individual mandates appear to be insurance regulations of general applicability—to all 
persons residing in the state—that should be saved from ERISA preemption as legitimate state 
regulation of insurance.  An individual mandate may or may not be des
e
 
Summary.  At this point, it is anybody’s guess how the Supreme Court might rule on whether 
ERISA preempts pay-or-play systems or how the lower courts would examine ERISA 
preemption challenges to individual mandates.  Small scale reforms will likely survive because 
they are unlikely to burden EBPs, but will hardly address the real problems facing the health care 
system.  Unfortunately, the kinds of large scale reforms that are desperately needed are likely to 
be preempted because, almost by definition, they must bind administrators to be successful.  
Accordingly, I anticipate that pay-or-play systems will not survive an ERISA preemption 
challenge, while individual mandates will not be preempted.  In short, the courts are unlikely to 
absolve Congress from
o
 
II  
able signal that it does not view its mandate as 
lleviating market or legislative deficiencies. 
ing to the states and constricting Congress’s legislative 
uthority under the Commerce Clause.54 
.  Congressional Action 
ermit broader state health reform 
itiatives, with patients’ rights as a secondary consideration.  
 
Before considering potential solutions, I should add a few words about ERISA in the context of 
federalism and separation of powers. 53  ERISA is a window through which health policy over 
the past 20 years or so can be observed.  As a philosophical matter, recent Supreme Court 
doctrine, particularly in ERISA preemption cases, is based on the doctrine of separation of 
powers.  One of the principal interpretive tenets or norms repeatedly stated by the current 
Supreme Court is that social policy should be made by the elected representatives, not by the 
courts.  The opinions considered above consistently observe that if ERISA preemption is to 
change, it is Congress’s responsibility, not the Supreme Court’s, to do so.  In strongly deferring 
to Congress, the Court has sent an unmistak
a
 
An important corollary doctrine about the structure of government is federalism—the question of 
whether power resides with the states or with the federal government.  This debate goes back to 
the earliest days of the republic, with the federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, arguing for a 
strong central government, while the Jeffersonians argued for greater state sovereignty.  From 
the New Deal through the early 1980s, Supreme Court rulings generally favored the federal 
government and expanded the reach of federal legislation.  Since then, that approach has been 
reversed, with the Court generally deferr
a
 
A
 
During the mid to late 1990s, one of the most contentious health policy debates was over 
patients’ rights, and whether to amend ERISA to permit state-based tort litigation against MCOs.  
Since 2001 this issue has faded into the background.  If the historical trends described earlier are 
accurate, attempts to amend ERISA are likely to reemerge as a salient health policy issue.  Only 
this time, the primary focus will be on amending ERISA to p
in
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reemption.  But with a new 
dministration and, more importantly, with large employers perhaps more desperate to ease their 
s.  At a minimum, 
ongress could consider enacting ERISA waivers to permit state health reform experiments to 
g about a disruptive ERISA preemption challenge.55 
me aspects of ERISA preemption and to facilitate state health reform initiatives.  One 
alternative suggested in Davila’s concurring opinion leaves considerable room for a regulatory 
respons
equity at 
e time of the divided bench."…[T]he Government's suggestion may indicate an 
le economic and noneconomic damages.  For instance, 
OL could develop a schedule of damages to include the cost of making the patient whole, along 
decisions.   Because the statutory definition of plan is somewhat tautological,  nothing 
In theory, amending ERISA preemption would be the easiest way to provide states with needed 
flexibility to enact health reform proposals.  In practice, there is still likely to be considerable 
congressional opposition to any weakening of ERISA p
a
health insurance costs, congressional action may be possible.   
 
One consideration is whether Congress could amend ERISA in a way to permit state reforms 
without opening EBPs to excessive regulatory scrutiny generally.  That is, the attempt to allow 
states greater freedom to pursue a variety of health reform experiments may have the unintended 
consequence of allowing more expansive state legislative oversight of EBP
C
proceed without worryin
 
B.  Regulatory Action 
 
Absent amending ERISA, the Obama administration could devise regulatory strategies to 
mitigate so
e: 
 
The Government notes a potential amelioration.  Recognizing that "this Court has 
construed Section 502(a)(3) not to authorize an award of money damages against 
a non-fiduciary," the Government suggests that the Act, as currently written and 
interpreted, may "allow at least some forms of 'make-whole' relief against a 
breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in 
th
effective remedy others similarly circumstanced might fruitfully pursue. 
 
As noted, most of the DOL’s regulatory actions have been on the pension side, and it has not 
acted to fill the vacuum on the health care benefits issues.  Unlike antitrust, where the judicial 
and regulatory branches interact—sometimes uneasily—to form antitrust policy, the courts have 
acted exclusively to shape ERISA preemption doctrine.  But DOL could issue regulations that 
would simultaneously protect patients and plans.  Taking an aggressive approach, DOL could 
define two of the key ERISA terms that courts or legislation has not defined—“plan” and 
“benefit”—to alleviate the rigidity of ERISA preemption.  Is benefit the payment of money, the 
goods, services the insurance purchases (i.e., medical care) or membership in an MCO?56  A 
major flaw in ERISA preemption is the limited damages available if a case is removed to federal 
court (i.e., patients can only recover the amount of the benefit).  To correct that deficiency, DOL 
might define benefit to include reasonab
D
with lost wages and pain and suffering.  
 
Similarly, several observers have noted that ERISA does not define a health plan,57 and the 
courts have only said that a plan is not the equivalent of the benefits themselves.58  For reasons 
that are not obvious, courts have ruled that MCOs are included in the definition of plan, but not 
physicians.  The result has been to preempt MCOs from state tort liability while leaving 
physicians exposed to full liability when they may not actually control resource allocation 
59 60
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 ERISA was not intended to “govern the relationships between employees and 
ird parties, such as MCOs.”61   
 interpretation for DOL to outline valid state 
ptions that would be saved from preemption. 
es go beyond the safe harbor, states could seek a waiver from DOL to 
ontinue the experiment.  
gulatory oversight of 
lan administrators, along with the accountability that is presently lacking. 
onclusion 
 option.  If that trend holds, state-based health 
form initiatives could be blocked if challenged. 
prevents DOL from issuing a regulation that clarifies the meaning of these two terms and 
establishes that
th
 
In terms of the current state health reform legislation, DOL could issue a regulation that sets the 
contours of how far states could proceed before implicating ERISA preemption.  The mechanism 
for this would be through an interpretation of the savings clause.  For example, DOL could adopt 
the direct/indirect analysis in the Travelers case and provide potential scenarios where a law 
would be within the scope of the savings clause.  Other governmental agencies, particularly the 
Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission’s health antitrust guidelines, have used a 
similar strategy.  Likewise, the key judicial consideration in the state reform legislation enacted 
so far is the dispute over what constitutes other legitimate compliance options in a pay-or-play 
system.  It would be an appropriate regulatory
o
 
Beyond the substantive regulations DOL might consider, the agency could adopt procedural 
regulations that would facilitate the implementation of health reform initiatives.  For instance, 
DOL could place the burden of justifying regulations of EBPs on the states.  DOL could outline 
what it considers to be the appropriate balance between flexible state health reforms and 
excessive regulation of EBPs.  As long as states operate within the safe harbor, DOL would 
support the reform.  If stat
c
 
As to whether courts would uphold these regulations, as a matter of the separation of powers, it 
would certainly be preferable for Congress to define these terms.  Absent that, it would be an 
appropriate exercise of regulatory discretion to address terms that neither the Court nor Congress 
has defined.  The health insurance industry would undoubtedly contest any regulations that 
weakened the current force of ERISA preemption.  Since these regulations complement rather 
than undermine ERISA preemption, courts should defer to DOL’s expertise.  Whether these or 
similar regulations would result in dramatically different legal doctrine remains to be seen.  For 
instance, courts might balk at any expanded remedy as violating ERISA’s exclusive remedial 
structure.  In any event, it will be difficult for regulators to overcome 25 years of judicial 
doctrine.  Suffice it to say that new regulations might provide state legislators with a more level 
playing field.  In particular, new regulations would impose some needed re
p
 
C
 
Regardless of what the options were at the outset of judicial consideration of ERISA preemption, 
the broad initial preemption rulings set the tone and scope of ERISA doctrine that continues to 
this day.  Yet if the analysis in this paper is correct, there is a certain consistency that emerges 
over time—the return to preemption as the default
re
 
It is entirely possible that my analysis imposes more of a narrative arc to ERISA interpretation 
and litigation than it deserves.62  Other commentators may well argue that there are too many 
exceptions to justify a “regression to the mean” trajectory.  Admittedly, I have not undertaken an 
adequate empirical analysis to determine whether the analytical frame I have sketched would fit 
 
O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001 
www.oneillinstitute.org 
15 
ment among commentators as to why ERISA should be 
terpreted one way or the other.   
The time has come for a new approach—one that facilitates reform instead of 
impeding it. 
the data.  As the split among commentators noted throughout suggests, interpreting ERISA 
litigation trends is highly subjective.  There is little clarity as to how ERISA will be interpreted 
in future cases, and little agree
in
 
Part of this uncertainty resides in a statute that is poorly and ambiguously drafted, and largely 
applicable to pension plans rather than the way health care is now organized and delivered.  
Congress has refused to amend ERISA, and the Department of Labor has generally refused to 
regulate it.  
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APPENDIX A 
Comparison of the Maryland and San Francisco “Pay or Play” Laws 
 Maryland (Wal-Mart) Law San Francisco Law 
What are the 
main 
provisions? 
Covered employers are required to spend at 
least 8% of their payroll on “health 
insurance costs.”  If the employer fails to 
spend the required amount, the law requires 
the employer to pay the difference between 
what the employer spent on health insurance 
costs and the 8% requirement into the 
Maryland Fair Share Health Care Fund.  
The Fund was to help finance Maryland’s 
Medicaid program. 
Covered employers are required to 
make minimum “health care 
expenditures” ranging from $1.17 to 
$1.76 per employee per hour 
depending on the number of full-time 
employees.  An employer has several 
options for meeting its “health care 
expenditure” requirement.  In addition 
to contributing in some way to 
payment for health care services or 
insurance, the employer has the option 
of paying its required expenditure to 
the city.  Amounts paid to the city will 
fund the Health Access Program, 
which aims to provide medical care to 
the uninsured population of San 
Francisco. 
What is the 
law’s 
purpose? 
Maryland was attempting to address the 
rising cost of Medicaid and the high 
proportion of uninsured people in the state.  
Legislative history indicates that legislators 
understood the Act as requiring Wal-Mart 
(the only company to which the act applied) 
to increase its healthcare spending.  The 
statute was specifically designed only to 
apply to Wal-Mart. 
Provide access to care for uninsured 
adults living in the city of San 
Francisco who do not qualify for 
coverage under Medicaid. 
 
 
What 
employers 
are covered? 
Employers with more than 10,000 
employees (NOTE: only four employers in 
the state met this number - Johns Hopkins 
University, Northrop Grumman, Giant 
Food, and Wal-Mart.  However, the law 
only applied to Wal-Mart because Johns 
Hopkins met the lesser requirement for non-
profits and Northrop Grumman and Giant 
Food spent enough on health care to be 
exempt). 
Under the Employer Spending 
Requirement, for-profit employers with 
more than 20 employees and non-profit 
employers with more than 50 
employees. 
Amount of 
employer 
contribution? 
For-profit employers were required to either 
1.) spend at least 8% of their payroll on 
health benefits or 2.) pay the difference 
directly into the state’s newly created public 
health care fund to defray Medicaid costs.   
Covered non-profit employers were required 
to spend 6% of their payroll on health 
benefits. 
Covered employers must contribute 
$1.17 to $1.76 per hour per employee 
toward “health care expenditures.” 
 
What options 
do employers 
have under 
the law? 
“Health insurance costs” defined as any 
amount paid by an employer to provide 
health care or health insurance to employees 
to the extent costs may be deductible under 
Health care expenditure” is defined as 
any amount paid by a covered 
employer to its employees or a third 
party on behalf of its employees for the 
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federal tax law.   Expenditures that could 
qualify as “health insurance costs” included: 
- Maintenance of on-site medical 
clinics. 
- Contribution to employees’ Health 
Savings Accounts. 
- Payment for medical care, 
prescription drugs, or vision care. 
- Restructure of employee benefits 
plans to increase amount paid 
toward insurance. 
- “Any other costs to provide health 
benefits.” 
 
An employer also had the option of paying 
the difference of what the employer 
contributed in health care expenditures and 
the 8% requirement into the Maryland Fair 
Share Fund. 
purpose of providing health care 
services.  Health care expenditures 
include:     
- Employer-provided insurance. 
- Contribution to employees’ 
health savings accounts. 
- Direct payment of medical 
bills to employees. 
- Payment to a third party for 
employees’ medical care. 
 
An employer also has the option of 
paying towards the new city program, 
Healthy San Francisco. 
Are there 
reporting 
requirements 
under the 
law? 
Yes.  Covered employer must make annual 
reports providing the amount spent by the 
employer on health insurance costs in the 
state, and the percentage of payroll that was 
spent by the employer on health insurance 
costs in the state.  
Yes.  Covered employers must report 
on their health care expenditures on an 
annual basis using the “Mandatory 
Annual Reporting Form” provided to 
all registered businesses in San 
Francisco.  
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